Where
did the money come from? Where did it go? How was this allowed to happen?
Who is to blame? These are the key questions surrounding the credit
crunch that has engulfed the global financial system.
The answer, in part, is that there wasn't anywhere near as much money
as there seemed to be. And because it didn't exist in the first place,
the money hasn't gone anywhere. It was all an illusion, although the
economic consequences of its disappearance turned out to be very real
indeed.
As to how it was allowed to happen and who is to blame, in a sense the
honest reply is that we all allowed it to happen, and we're all to blame,
either as active accomplices or complicit bystanders. Society as a whole
made a collective, unconscious decision to allow the banking system
to grow unchecked because the tangible benefits that seemed to accrue
from unbridled capitalism outweighed the intangible hazards that might
accompany this dangerous test of capitalism's limits.
Consider an analogous bit of history. In nineteenth-century Britain,
physicians finally began to understand human physiology, working out
the body's geography by mapping veins and arteries, dissecting eyes
and hearts, and manipulating bones and joints. The new knowledge promised
to usher in a period of unprecedented medical advancement.
Religious beliefs and general distaste, however, meant that few people
would send the corpses of deceased relatives to the gurneys of surgeons
with eager scalpels. After all, how could a dismembered body pass through
the gates of heaven? Surgeons instead dissected the bodies of executed
criminals, who lost dominion over their body parts' destination upon
conviction.
But -- even fueled by the era's commonplace executions -- supply was
insufficient to meet demand. A shadowy secondary market in cadavers
developed; those who died in a hospital and weren't quickly claimed
by their loved ones moved from mortuaries to teaching hospitals, sold
by undertakers and bought by physicians. Even those claimed by family
and properly buried could be dug up and sold to satiate the needs of
the anatomists.
The authorities -- both legal and medical -- turned a blind eye to the
practice of grave robbing, while the general public remained ignorant
about how doctors were getting smarter. For society as a whole, it was
a win-win situation -- until a pair of entrepreneurs called William
Burke and William Hare decided to circumvent the waiting time demanded
by nature, started murdering for profit, and brought the whole grisly,
underhanded process into the open.
A similar conspiracy of vested interests caused the credit crunch. Any
banker, trader, investor, or economist asked to invent the perfect financial
market environment for creating global wealth beyond the wildest dreams
of avarice would have come up with a list of conditions similar to those
that have prevailed for the past decade.
Like those of Burke and Hare, these good times have ended with an almighty
bang, not a whimper, wiping out the nest eggs of millions of workers
by destroying stock market values around the world, undermining ordinary
savers' confidence in the safety of the banking system, and exposing
deep fault lines in the philosophy of capitalism. The financial community,
through a deadly combination of greed and hubris, fouled its own sandpit.
The era of munificent money-making conditions -- regulation and oversight
so gentle as to be almost invisible, ever-faster data and information
flows, freely available credit at super-low interest rates, unprecedented
access to investors all around the world, and oil-enriched buyers of
any investment yielding north of zero -- is over.
The global financial authorities -- the elected politicians who decree
the legal framework within which finance operates; the unelected central
banks charged with tending the economy, the regulators responsible for
creating and enforcing safety rules; the money managers entrusted with
nurturing the future incomes of widows, orphans, and hordes of other
savers; and the people paying themselves millions of dollars to run
the investment banks -- all looked the other way. They operated under
the belief that the monetary benefits accruing to society from incessant,
unprecedented, and essentially unregulated growth in the securities
industry more than outweighed any of the attendant risks.
In the U.S., the rising economic tide was seen to lift all boats, underlining
the political triumph of capitalism over socialism and communism. In
Europe, increased prosperity helped cement the decades-old dream of
a common currency, binding nations closely enough to nullify the nagging
conflicts that gave rise to two world wars, with the U.K. playing a
supporting role as the unofficial treasurer to its continental, euro-embracing
neighbors, even as it clung stubbornly on to its own currency. And across
swathes of Asia, globalization and growing international trade helped
fund the transition from agrarian to manufacturing economies, with governments
offering compensatory affluence to avert discussions about democracy
and voting systems, thereby blunting the risk of social unrest.
The list of credit crunch perpetrators is long. Realtors appraised houses
at fictitious levels. Lenders granted mortgages to people who couldn't
pay. Aspiring homeowners bought properties that they couldn't afford,
taking on debt burdens they couldn't support. Frankenstein bankers cobbled
together nasty parts of different markets, creating instruments they
couldn't value or control. Credit rating companies stamped their highest
seals of approval on nearly anything and everything that crossed their
desks. Traders invented prices they couldn't justify. Investors bought
securities they didn't understand. And there are thousands and thousands
of fleas on the financial dog; armies of lawyers and accountants earned
their livings during the past decade by scrutinizing deals or by getting
paid to rubberstamp transactions.
The people in the world of high finance aren't stupid. For at least
a decade, the finest graduates of universities all over the globe have
been drawn to Wall Street and its counterparts in the world's biggest
cities. Little wonder, then, that market regulators struggled to either
find or retain talented staff, when the rewards for jumping the fence
and becoming a poacher rather than a gamekeeper were so rich. Investment
banks and hedge funds became employment black holes, sucking in talent
to the detriment of arguably more productive, clearly less lucrative
disciplines, such as engineering and science.
The credit crunch wasn't caused so much by a confederacy of dunces as
by a silent conspiracy of the well rewarded. And most of the participants
aren't fraudsters (albeit with some notable exceptions), nor are they
evil or malicious. But everyone involved collectively suspended disbelief,
a mass self-induced myopia to the possibility that anything could go
wrong, because the financial rewards for playing along were so compelling.
Excerpted
from COMPLICIT by Mark Gilbert, with permission of Bloomberg Press (February
2010).